

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE

9–11 April
Utrecht

Keynotes:
Barry Smith
Alan Richardson
Dale Jacquette



Fundatie van
Renswoude
Agnietenstraat 5

philosophyasscience.com

Programme

Thursday, April 9

Collegezaal

15.00 Welcome with coffee and tea

Regentenzaal

15.45 Opening: Carlo Ierna

16.00 Plenary session: **Paul Ziche**
“Feelings, empiricism, and realism”

16.30 Keynote: **Barry Smith**
“Metaphysics After Darwin”

Collegezaal

18.00 Reception with drinks and refreshments

Friday, April 10

- Regentenzaal*
- 09.00–10.00 Keynote: **Alan Richardson**
“Disillusionment, Inconvenience, and Scientific Philosophy: Logical Empiricism and Philosophical Modernism”
- 10.00–10.45 *Collegezaal* **Wolfgang Huemer** *Regentenzaal* **Dirk van Miert**
““Vera philosophiae methodus”: Brentano’s conception of philosophy as rigorous science” “Writing the history of science around 1800”
- 10.45–11.00 *Kitchen*: Coffee break
- 11.00–11.45 *Collegezaal* **Guillaume Frechette** *Regentenzaal* **Dietmar Heidemann**
“The Descriptive Psychology Research Programme – Brentano’s Contribution to Scientific Philosophy” “Kant’s discovery of realism”
- 11.45–12.30 *Regentenzaal*
Plenary session: **Denis Fisette**
“Psychology as Science. Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte’s Positivism”
- 12.30–13.30 *Kitchen*: Lunch break
- 13.30–15.00 *Regentenzaal*
Plenary panel “Thinking classified: Structuring the world of ideas around 1800”
Peter Sperber “Philosophy’s Scientific Method: Transcendental Methodology in Kant and Fries”
Timmy de Goeij “Kant’s Campaign against the Synthesis of Empiricism and Rationalism”
- 15.00 *Kitchen*: Coffee break
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- Optional: Academieggebouw, Senaatszaal
16.15 Inaugural lecture Ingrid Robeyns, chair “Ethics of Institutions”
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- Brasserie Bresson*
- 19.00 Speakers’ dinner

Saturday, April 11

Regentenzaal

- 09.00–10.00 **Keynote: Dale Jacquette**
“Brentano and the Ambiguities of Scientific Philosophy”

Regentenzaal

- 10.00–10.45 **Robin Rollinger**
“Keeping Things Real: Brentano’s Metaphysical Rejection of Bolzano and Husserl”

Collegezaal

- Karianne Marx**
“Towards a ‘philosophy without a nickname’: How Reinhold sought to overcome spiritualism, materialism, dogmatic skepticism and supernaturalism”

- 10.45–11.00 *Kitchen:* Coffee break

Regentenzaal

- 11.00–11.45 **Peter Andras Varga**
“To Deny Scientific Knowledge in Order to Make Room for Philosophy as Science: The Ignorabimus Debate and its Influence on Brentano’s and Husserl’s Notions of Metaphysics”

Collegezaal

- Helmut Pulte**
“„Das Lob der wissenschaftlichen Trockenheit“: J.F. Fries über wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Empirismus, Kritizismus und die Dynamisierung des Kantischen Apriori.”

- 11.45–12.30 **Hynek Janousek**
“Husserl on Ideal Meaning of Science and its Expressibility”

Olaf Müller

- “On the Very Idea of Goethe’s, Schelling’s, and Ritter’s Polarity”

- 12.30–13.30 *Kitchen:* Lunch break

Regentenzaal

- 13.30–14.15 **Harald Wiltsche**
“Empiricism, Phenomenology, and Science”

Collegezaal

- Petr Rezvykh**
“„Dogmatismus“ und „Kritizismus“ in F.W.J.Schellings Frühwerk”

- 14.15–15.00 **Arianna Betti**
“Philosophy as an Axiomatic Science? Bolzano’s Characterization of Philosophy in *Was ist Philosophie?* (1849) in the light of his Theory of Grounding”

Claus Beisbart

- “Whewell’s Conception of Philosophy of Science”

- 15.00–15.30 *Kitchen:* Coffee break

Regentenzaal

- 15.30–16.15 Plenary session: **Carlo Ierna**
“The Foundation of Philosophy as Science”

Abstracts

Keynotes

Barry Smith “Metaphysics after Darwin” There is a continuous line of development which leads from the metaphysics of Aristotle to the biological classifications of Linnaeus. This line, on one common conception, was broken by the work of Darwin, who showed how Aristotelian realism and the metaphysics based thereon were no longer tenable. I will challenge this common conception, and argue that — precisely as a result of Darwin’s work — we are today living in a golden age of Aristotelian classification. I will conclude by drawing out the implications of this argument for our understanding of the relations between philosophy and science.

Alan Richardson “Disillusionment, Inconvenience, and Scientific Philosophy: Logical Empiricism and Philosophical Modernism” This paper reports on a late stage of the development of scientific philosophy—logical empiricism in its European phase. The paper seeks to approach the vexed question of the “political” or “social” project of logical empiricism by dissociating it from grand transhistorical narratives of Enlightenment and placing it firmly into a philosophical modernism deeply informed by Weber’s views of science and its social value.

Dale Jacquette “Brentano and the Ambiguities of Scientific Philosophy” Franz Brentano proposes to make philosophy scientific. But in what exact sense? Empiricism is not monolithic, and there are different empiricist ideologies as well as styles of prioritizing experience and perception in philosophy, especially in epistemology and metaphysics. Brentano understands his work in philosophical psychology as scientific in the sense that it is experience-grounded in its epistemology, philosophical methodology and metaphysics. Brentano’s concept of scientific philosophy is nevertheless at odds with competing positivistic paradigms in the philosophy of science that were also beginning to gather momentum at roughly the same time, that exclude precisely the inner perception (*innere Wahrnehmung*) that Brentano develops from Aristotle’s *De anima*, and on which he relies for the phenomenological ‘observation’ of states of mind that are meant to make his philosophical psychology empirical and by that standard scientific. Whether Brentano’s contributions to philosophy are actually scientific depends essentially on whether the experiential evidence on which science builds can include or must exclude Brentano’s faculty of inner perception as non-public, subjective, private, unverifiable, and by that contrary criterion unscientific. Brentano’s philosophy, at the forefront of opposition to prevailing philosophical trends in the later nineteenth century, is properly scientific only if Brentano’s phenomenological or descriptive psychological consideration of the structures and contents of thoughts is properly scientific. Which is to say, only if the category of inner perception is not a misnomer, but a genuine mode of perception in a scientifically respectable sense of empirical observation, of which it makes sense to speak as experiential. This is a perennial problem for science, philosophy, and scientific philosophy that conspicuously arises in Brentano’s philosophical psychology. Brentano at different times tries to follow empiricism in two historically important but ideologically incompatible metaphysics, (naïve realist) Aristotelian and (idealist) British Enlightenment empiricisms, highlighting another crucial ambiguity in the possibilities for exact interpretation of his philosophy as scientific.

Sessions

Thursday

Paul Ziche “Feelings, Empiricism, and Realism” In the discussions within, and around, the Idealists’ philosophy around 1800, the typical labels that we continue to use until today in characterizing various types of philosophy, both acquire their function and undergo immediate transformations. “*Idealism*” is not only contrasted with “*realism*”, but both are changed into what has been called “higher idealism” and “higher realism”, and the same happens with “*empiricism*”. One of the most striking observations is that in these processes the various forms of philosophy start to overlap: Schelling and Schleiermacher, to name two instances of idealism-based thinkers, propagate a “higher realism” and “higher empiricism”. With other realists of this period, they share a strong interest in *feelings* – however, the faculty of feeling itself undergoes changes in the negotiations taking place within the typology of forms of philosophy. Drawing upon source texts from idealists, realists, “higher realists” and “empiricists” in the period around 1800, and making use of present-day discussions of active vs. receptive faculties, this presentation will discuss these negotiations and some of their implications.

Friday

Wolfgang Huemer ““Vera philosophiae methodus”: Brentano’s conception of philosophy as rigorous science” In his *Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano* Carl Stumpf notes that it was Brentano’s conception of the nature of philosophy – famously expressed in his 4th Habilitation-thesis – that most fascinated his young students in Würzburg; they received it, according to Stumpf, as a moment of innovation that stood for a new profoundness and seriousness in philosophy. Other philosophers have been quite perplexed by this thesis; Moritz Schlick, for example, suggests that it stands in sharp contrast with the rest of Brentano’s philosophy – which, as he adds, every scientifically oriented philosopher would have to reject. In my contribution I will argue that Brentano’s thesis is best understood not as a manifesto of a precursor of scientific naturalism as it was developed in the twentieth century (by Quine and others), but rather as a rejection of the widespread idealistic and speculative approaches in philosophy, in particular against all forms of German idealism. I will discuss Brentano’s understanding of the relation between philosophy and the sciences by taking into account also his later views on the relation between descriptive and genetic psychology and contrast Brentano’s view of a scientific philosophy with Husserl’s views on philosophy as a rigorous science.

Dirk van Miert “Writing the history of science around 1800”

Denis Fiset “Psychology as Science. Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte’s Positivism” My aim is to show that the philosophical programme elaborated by Brentano in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is largely indebted to the research conducted by Brentano on British empiricism and Comte’s positive philosophy at Würzburg. This research represents the starting point of, and backdrop to, the project of a psychology as science, which is at the heart of his *Hauptwerk*, and sheds new light on the philosophical stakes of many debates he leads in that work. Furthermore, Brentano’s research informs us about his philosophical preoccupations during the

Würzburg period, and simultaneously provide us with a new perspective on the evolution of his thought from his habilitation at Würzburg in 1866 to his arrival in Vienna in 1874. In this talk, I propose to examine some of the factors that motivated the interest of the young Brentano in Comte's positive philosophy and to evaluate the influence that the latter exerted on Brentano's programme of a psychology as science.

Guillaume Frechette “The Descriptive Psychology Research Programme – Brentano’s Contribution to Scientific Philosophy” In this talk, I propose a reconstruction of the fundamental insights of Franz Brentano's (1838–1917) descriptive psychology research program (DPRP), as it was formulated in three lectures from the Vienna period: I: ‘Descriptive psychology’ (1887/88), II: ‘Descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology’ (1888/89) and III: ‘Psychognosy’ (1890/91). Despite the apparent marginal concern with descriptive psychology – sometimes called ‘psychognosy’, ‘phenomenognosy’, or ‘phenomenology’ – in works published during his lifetime, Brentano had a clear and well-developed conception of the theme as a scientific investigation of the contents of our mental states; it was not developed as a *prima philosophia*, or as a system of philosophy, as it is often thought to be, but rather as a scientific research program of its own, which challenged other research programs of the time, such as Wundt's physiological psychology or Fechner's psychophysics. I will outline the fundamentals of DPRP, the content of its hard core and the set of auxiliary hypotheses used in the Vienna lectures and will contrast them with some of the ‘Cartesian’ principles often attributed to Brentano's philosophy of mind, suggesting that these principles do not constitute any part of the hard core of DPRP.

Dietmar Heidemann “Kant’s discovery of realism” Kant is not only the inventor of (transcendental) idealism but also the discoverer of the philosophical term „realism“. Although transcendental idealism responds to the key question of whether and how metaphysics is possible as a science, the question itself is closely connected to the kind of realism people endorse. Kant not only discovers philosophical “realism”, but also is by the same token the first one to provide an intriguing discussion of different versions of realism, i.e., transcendental and empirical realism. According to transcendental realism the external world is in a strong sense independent of the general philosophical or scientific framework theory we subscribe to. Empirical realists deny this view and argue that our external world beliefs cannot be justified beyond such a theory. For Kant transcendental realists like Descartes or Leibniz are unable to make *metaphysica specialis* and *generalis* a science whereas only empirical realism can support the project of scientific philosophy. The paper explores the arguments Kant puts forward in favour of this view and contends that one way or the other Kant's analysis of “realism” has had an enormous impact on the subsequent (idealist) debate on making philosophy a science.

Peter Sperber “Philosophy’s Scientific Method: Transcendental Methodology in Kant and Fries” Despite of its central importance to Kant's philosophical project, no clear and convincing account has so far been given of Kant's methodology with regard to what he calls ‘transcendental proofs’. In the first part of this presentation I argue shortly that one important reason for this is that Kant commits himself to four methodological claims that cannot be consistently defended together. In the second part I argue that a sophisticated attempt to resolve this methodological inconsistency can be found in the work of the much-neglected Kantian philosopher Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-

1843). Fries argued that this methodological problem could only be resolved by dropping Kant's assumption that transcendental method should be understood in terms of proof. Instead, Fries proposes that we can make sense of transcendental methodology by understanding it in terms of theory formation. While this account has been almost completely ignored in contemporary scholarship, it is of crucial historical importance: against the German Idealist tradition, Fries provided an attractive alternative picture of Kantianism that placed philosophy much closer to the empirical sciences.

Timmy de Goeij “Kant’s Campaign against the Synthesis of Empiricism and Rationalism”

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is traditionally understood as providing the synthesis of empiricism and rationalism. However, in this presentation I will present a reversal of this picture. The main aim of the critical project of the *Critique* is to demarcate the idea of metaphysics. According to Kant, his dogmatic predecessors could not arrive at the 'genuine' idea of metaphysics, precisely because they continuously in one way or another synthesized and mixed the rational use of reason with the empirical use of reason. Kant set out to prevent these dogmatic syntheses by emphasizing the heterogeneous and irreducible character of sensibility and the understanding. By means of this doctrine of the two stems of cognition, Kant separated the pure use of reason from the empirical use, and ascribed to each their own domains of application. This eventually led to the differentiation of philosophy proper, which becomes the pure science of the conceptual framework of our experience, from the empirical sciences, which are concerned with determining the content of experience. The result is a new understanding of what makes science scientific.

Saturday

Robin Rollinger “Keeping Things Real: Brentano’s Metaphysical Rejection of Bolzano and Husserl” Husserl's decisive breakthrough in his endeavor to understand logic was his *Logical Investigations*, in which the influence of Bernard Bolzano can clearly be found. What Husserl found especially appealing in Bolzano's understanding of logic was the notion of “propositions in themselves”. These were taken to be truth-bearers which are distinct from acts of judgment and indeed from all else that exists or occurs in space and time. When Husserl explained this Bolzanian influence to his mentor, Franz Brentano, it was by no means met with acceptance. Brentano attempted to convince Husserl in letters that logic can do without such *Gedankendinge* as propositions in themselves. Underlying Brentano's exchange with Husserl is the philosophical position that has come to be known as reism, according to which everything that exists is a thing, whether it be mental or corporeal. This position was in fact crucial to Brentano's on-going attempt to work out a metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. the inquiry into being qua being. In this paper it will be shown why the notion of propositions in themselves, especially Husserl's rather Platonistic interpretation of them, must be rejected from this metaphysical point of view.

Karianne Marx “Towards a ‘philosophy without a nickname’: How K. L. Reinhold sought to overcome spiritualism, materialism, dogmatic skepticism and supernaturalism” In the wake of Kant's critical project, Karl Leonhard Reinhold was convinced that a new day was dawning for philosophy and that the conflicts and misunderstandings that had been ubiquitous throughout its history could now be decided once and for all. This would enable a more scientific

way of philosophizing in which finally, some real progress could be made. Instead of this or that philosophy there would only be Philosophy, period.

This paper aims to shed light on Reinhold's interpretation of the rival philosophical schools at his time (spiritualism, materialism, dogmatic skepticism and supernaturalism) and what is needed to overcome this rivalry and move towards one harmonious, scientific philosophy.

Peter Andras Varga “To Deny Scientific Knowledge in Order to Make Room for Philosophy as Science: The Ignorabimus Debate and its Influence on Brentano’s and Husserl’s Notions of Metaphysics” Even though it has been mostly forgotten by now, the Ignorabimus Debate was one of the key events that marked the German academic philosophy and the surrounding disciplines from the 1870s onwards. Already the contemporaneous observers described this period as a renaissance of philosophy, when philosophy tried to re-establish itself against the dominance of the increasingly successful natural sciences that were perceived as protruding into the traditional domains of philosophy after the demise of German Idealism in the earlier half of the century. It is thus far from being surprising that an inaugural address delivered by Emil Du Bois-Reymond at the *Annual Assembly of German Scientist and Physicians* in Leipzig in 1872, in which Du Bois-Reymond (himself a leading physiologist and an influential member of the academic establishment in Berlin) argued for necessary limits of the knowledge pretensions of natural sciences, has produced immense echo. Du Bois-Reymond’s theses, which he reinforced at a public lecture in Berlin in 1880 (both addresses were published and widely read), have not only reverberated in the cultural-political consciousness of that time, forced materialism to go on the defensive and were greeted by thinkers originally hostile to materialism, i.e. by Catholic intellectuals, but they have also spurred a series of philosophical attempts at establishing methodically different regions of science, including Dilthey’s *Introduction to the Human Sciences* in 1883 (furthermore, even certain traits of Carnap’s *The Logical Structure* and Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* have been linked to this debate). Up to now, however, it seemed that the nascent phenomenology remained untouched by this debate. The recent surge of scholarly interest in this debate barely mentions Franz Brentano or Edmund Husserl. Already the publication date of Brentano’s seminal *Psychology*, however, renders it extremely unlikely that Brentano had been unaware of Du Bois-Reymond. I first investigate the traces of an influence of the Ignorabimus Debate on Brentano during the transition between his Würzburg and Vienna periods. I believe that this influence could be linked to Brentano’s metaphysical pretensions, resp. the discrepancies between the reception of Brentano’s work and his real position as manifested by the surrounding work manuscripts. The second thinker I focus on is Edmund Husserl. I believe that the Ignorabimus Debate not only provides a particularly telling example of the various diffuse influences that were received by the young Husserl, but it could also serve as a historically anchored basis for understanding the continuous evolution of Husserl’s notion of metaphysics during the incubation of his *Logical Investigations* and the subsequent transition to transcendental phenomenology.

Olaf Müller “On the Very Idea of Goethe’s, Schelling’s, and Ritter’s Polarity” Goethe and Schelling’s first collaboration was on a number of optical experiments. Schelling learned from Goethe that many colour phenomena have dualistic counterparts, and that there is an optical symmetry, or duality, between light and darkness. Goethe learned from Schelling that polarity can be used as a guiding principle for scientific research (i.e., as a regulative idea à la Kant). Ritter,

who cooperated scientifically with Goethe, exploited the principle of polarity when he made his most famous scientific discovery of what we now call UV-light. The considerable potential this principle may have for optical research has so far been underestimated and underexplored. One reason for this neglect has to do with the fact that some of the principle's proponents applied it excessively and dubiously – outside optics. If it had not been for this misuse, physicists might have shown a less hostile reaction to Goethe's *theory of colours* (*Farbenlehre*). Bad luck for Goethe.

Hynek Janousek “Husserl on Ideal Meaning of Science and its Expressibility” The lecture wants to shortly present some aspects of Husserl's first move toward ideality of meaning as it can be reconstructed on the background of Husserl's 1893/1894 manuscripts. The ideality of meaning which was accepted at this stage served as a paradigm which was later on reworked into Husserl's later theory of linguistic meaning as it is found in his *Logical Investigations*. The lecture discusses a certain problem of this book which follows from Husserl's own presuppositions. This problem involves the question of expressibility of the quality of the intentional essence of the act – „quality“ being Husserl's term roughly corresponding to the later and more common concept of propositional attitude. The lecture argues for a certain gap in Husserl's theory concerning the expressibility of the quality as well as for the fact that the expressibility of the quality seems to be already presupposed in the ideal meaning of the linguistic expressions used in the solitary life of the speaker. In this way, Husserl's original sharp distinctions between communicative and solitary use of scientific linguistic expressions might be called into question even in its initial stage.

Helmut Pulte “„Das Lob der wissenschaftlichen Trockenheit“: Jakob Friedrich Fries über wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Empirismus, Kritizismus und die Dynamisierung des Kantischen Apriori” „Das Lob der wissenschaftlichen Trockenheit“ – dieser Titel eines Vortrags von J. F. Fries (1773-1843) kann als Leitgedanken seines Philosophierens generell verstanden werden, das er in einem eminenten Sinne als ‚*wissenschaftliches Philosophieren*‘ versteht. Fries verbindet damit eine Abgrenzung in zweierlei Hinsicht: *synchron* gegenüber einer (von ihm so genannten) ‚populären‘, ‚mystifizierenden‘, ‚mythologischen‘ oder (gelegentlich auch:) ‚arbeitsscheuen‘ Philosophie, die er im deutschen Idealismus am Werke sieht, *diachron* gegenüber ‚Empirismus‘ und ‚Rationalismus‘, die er in ihrer historischen Form als überkommen ansieht. Positiv gewendet, ist wissenschaftliche Philosophie für Fries eine Weiterentwicklung der Transzendentalphilosophie Kants – ein *spezifischer* Kritizismus, der den Entwicklungen der Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts philosophisch Rechnung zu tragen sucht. Im Vortrag soll zum einen Fries' Programmatik einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie umrissen werden, zum anderen sollen exemplarisch an zumindest einem Ausschnitt seiner Wissenschaftstheorie – der Dynamisierung des Kantischen Apriori – konkrete Konsequenzen seines Ansatzes aufgezeigt werden.

Harald Wiltsche “Empiricism, Phenomenology, and Science” Much of what Husserl thought needs to be done in order to make philosophy truly "scientific" is encapsulated in the well-known slogan "Back to the things themselves!". Instead of forcing problems into a pre-established (and potentially artificial) theoretical mold, phenomenology seeks to ground claims to knowledge in experience through which "the things themselves" appear. But what does Husserl mean by "experience"? And what precisely are the "things themselves"?

It is these questions that I wish to address in my talk. In order to do so, I will start with a brief exposition of Husserl's critique of empiricism in the first part of my presentation. I will then use this critique as a foil against the background of which Husserl's positive views regarding philosophical "Wissenschaftlichkeit" will be characterized. The third and final part of my talk is concerned with the question as to how these views shape Husserl's interpretation of the physical sciences. My thesis is that, although Husserl opposed empiricism in crucial respects, his understanding of scientific theories resembles that of more radical empiricists such as Bas van Fraassen.

Petr Rezvykh "Dogmatismus" und "Kritizismus" in F.W.J.Schellings Frühwerk"

Arianna Betti "Philosophy as an Axiomatic Science? Bolzano's Characterization of Philosophy in *Was ist Philosophie?* (1849) in the light of his Theory of Grounding" Like other 19th century philosophers, Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) viewed philosophy as science, in particular, as "the science of the objective connection of all those truths the ultimate grounds of which we make our own business to penetrate as far as possible in order to thus become wiser and better." ("Philosophie ist die Wissenschaft von dem objectiven Zusammenhange aller derjenigen Wahrheiten, in deren letzten Gründe nach Möglichkeit einzudringen, wir uns zu einer Aufgabe machen, um dadurch weiser und besser zu werden", Bolzano 1849). This characterization seems particularly revealing insofar as 'objective connection of truths' is Bolzano's alternative term for *grounding* among true propositions (*Sätze an sich*), a notion which is part and parcel of Bolzano's view on (proper) sciences as axiomatic orderings of truths. Bolzano's characterisation would thus imply that philosophy is an axiomatic science, and the question arises as to the kind of propositions philosophy would be an aggregate of. Following one interpretation on the market (de Jong 2001), grounding is a relation such that all analytic truths are grounded in synthetic truths. That would imply that if philosophy is, indeed, a grounded ordering of truths, then it is a grounded ordering of truths that are synthetic, with the possible exception of truths at the very end of the grounding ordering, which might be analytic. We present work preparatory to this investigation. We review recent work on grounding, and we strengthen the evidence for the link between the analytic-synthetic distinction and the ground-consequence. We do the latter by presenting results of the application of *SalVe*, a newly developed text-mining tool for computational analysis of philosophical texts. Analysis of the *Wissenschaftslehre* with *SalVe* gave quantitative information about the *Wissenschaftslehre* that supports my interpretation. As such, this talk will illustrate the potential of computational methods within philosophy.

Claus Beisbart "Whewell's Conception of Philosophy of Science" William Whewell is an eminent figure in the history of philosophy of science not just because he has invented the term „scientist“, but also because he has contributed a number of influential works that have „Philosophy of science“ in their titles and that consider the scientific method. But what is his conception of *philosophy* of science? How does he think about the aims and the methods of this very discipline, in particular in the view of the history of science? And are the sciences and philosophy related in his views? The aim of this talk is to carve out Whewell's conception of philosophy of science and to contextualize it in view of Kant's influence and of the debates about empiricism.

Carlo Ierna “The Foundation of Philosophy as Science” What is the keystone of Brentano’s thesis that “The True Method of Philosophy is none other than that of the Natural Sciences”? What were Brentano’s conceptions of philosophy and of science and how did he think to connect these two together into a continuum?

Historically, his 1866 theses imply a new framework for doing philosophy as science, further worked out in his 1874 *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and then later in his lectures throughout the 1880s and ’90s. As is well known, the famous fourth habilitation thesis became the north star of his school, rallying his first students to his flag, and remained a central and lasting concern for many of them.

In my talk I will look at the connection between Brentano’s efforts to establish philosophy and psychology as sciences and their relation to the other sciences, both the *Natur-* as well as the *Geisteswissenschaften*. I point to the analysis of sensation and the formulation of an interdisciplinary science of consciousness as the central foundational element in his project. I analyze Brentano’s conception of sensation as “fundamental presentations of real physical phenomena” and the epistemological and ontological status of physical phenomena and their causes. From there, I draw some conclusions about what really unites most sciences, including mathematics, and the interdependence of *Natur-* and *Geisteswissenschaften*.